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Getting Down to Brass Tax: Why Courts Should
Use Equitable Tolling to Help TaxpayerPetitioners Impacted by COVID-19
Hannah Fisher†

I.

INTRODUCTION

Filing deadlines, and the varying ramifications for failing to satisfy
them, have been a longstanding fixture of the American litigation landscape.1 When faced with a plaintiff who has brought an untimely petition, a court must first determine whether Congress clearly intended
the filing deadline to be a prerequisite to its jurisdiction over the suit.2
If the court determines that the deadline is indeed a jurisdictional requirement, the court must dismiss the claim, no matter the stage of the
litigation.3 But if the court concludes that Congress did not intend to tie
the requirement to jurisdiction, rendering it a mere claims-processing
rule, the court may evaluate the availability of waiver, forfeiture, or equitable tolling.4
In normal times, when plaintiffs fail to diligently assert their
rights, invalidating late-arriving suits serves societal interests. Statutes of limitation promote the quality of litigation and provide repose
for defendants;5 further, classifying time limits as jurisdictional fortifies
†

B.S., Texas A&M University, 2018; J.D. Candidate, The University of Chicago Law School,
2022. Many thanks to Professor William Hubbard and the editorial staff of the Legal Forum for
their thoughtful feedback at every iteration of this piece. I am also endlessly grateful for the support of my friends and family along the way.
1
E. King Poor, Jurisdictional Deadlines in the Wake of Kontrick and Eberhart: Harmonizing
160 Years of Precedent, 40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 181, 187 (2006) (discussing United States v. Curry
as an early example of holding a filing deadline to be a jurisdictional requirement).
2
Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515–16 (2006).
3
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 434 (2011) (“[F]ederal courts have
an independent obligation to ensure that they do not exceed the scope of their jurisdiction, and
therefore they must raise and decide jurisdictional questions that the parties either overlook or
elect not to press.”).
4
United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 407–410 (2015) (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of
Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)).
5
Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew Wistrich, The Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC.
L.J. 453, 456–57 (1997).
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the separation of powers by preventing judges from exercising their own
discretion, which could potentially frustrate Congress’s objectives in
setting the limitation period.6
However, as often noted by the media, the events of 2020 were unprecedented in many ways.7 In March of that year, the global sweep of
the novel coronavirus, or COVID-19, reached the United States.8 One
year later, the pandemic had infected close to thirty million people and
claimed the lives of more than 485,000.9 Studies estimate that more
than eight million Americans fell below the poverty line during the pandemic.10 Just six months after COVID-19 reached the United States,
business review platform Yelp reported that over 160,000 businesses
listed on its website had closed, with approximately 60 percent of those
closures being permanent.11
As if the economic downturn was not already felt sharply enough,
the pandemic’s arrival painfully coincided with the peak of the United
States tax season. Income taxes were scheduled to be due just as the
unemployment rate was skyrocketing; April 2020 saw a historically unprecedented increase of the unemployment rate to 14.7 percent, or 23.1
million unemployed persons.12 At the direction of President Trump, the
6

Perry Dane, Jurisdictionality, Time, and the Legal Imagination, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 61–
66 (1994).
7
See, e.g., Leading Through an Unprecedented Time of Uncertainty, WASH. POST (Oct. 13,
2020), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/leading-through-an-unprecedented-time-of-uncertainty/2020/10/09/a5b25a06-ba46-11ea-bdaf-a129f921026f_story.html [https://perma.cc/KH25RZBB] (describing leading during an economic recession, health pandemic, and social unrest in
response to racial injustice as “a monumental, unprecedented leadership challenge”); Maria
Cheng, UN: Europe’s Pandemic Restrictions Are Absolutely Necessary, ABC NEWS (Oct. 15, 2020)
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/wireStory/europes-pandemic-restrictions-absolutely-73629612
[https://perma.cc/HQN3-LUA4] (discussing COVID-related restrictions as possibly necessary due
to these being such “unprecedented times”); Christopher Carbone, Defeating COVID-19 Requires
Unprecedented Action and Collaboration, Top US Scientists Say, FOX NEWS (May 18, 2020),
https://www.foxnews.com/science/defeating-covid-19-unprecedented-action-collaboration-us-scientists [https://perma.cc/UVZ5-5YS4] (quoting scientists for their position that high degrees of collaboration would be necessary to respond to “these unprecedented times”).
8
COVID in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, N.Y. TIMES (last updated July 22, 2021),
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/us/covid-cases-deaths-tracker.html?
[https://perma.cc/P4YL-TY6W].
9
Id.
10
Zachary Parolin et al., Monthly Poverty Rates in the United States During the COVID-19
Pandemic (Oct. 15, 2020) (unpublished discussion paper), http://static1.squarespace.com/static
/5743308460b5e922a25a6dc7/t/5f87c59e4cd0011fabd38973/1602733471158/COVID-ProjectingPoverty-Monthly-CPSP-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/NHG4-TLC5]; Catarina Saraiva, U.S. Suffers
Sharpest Rise in Poverty Rate in More Than 50 Years, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 25, 2021),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-25/u-s-suffers-sharpest-rise-in-poverty-rate-inmore-than-50-years [https://perma.cc/69FL-PNYG].
11
Anjali Sundaram, Yelp Data Shows 60% of Business Closures Due to the Coronavirus Pandemic Are Now Permanent, CNBC (Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/09/16/yelp-datashows-60percent-of-business-closures-due-to-the-coronavirus-pandemic-are-now-permanent.html
[https://perma.cc/W2HA-YMCW].
12
The Employment Situation, March 2020, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., http://www.bls.gov
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Internal Revenue Service (IRS) responded to the declared state of emergency by issuing a series of notices postponing the due dates for some
deadlines, including filing federal income tax returns and making payments on that tax as well as interest, additions, and penalties.13 As a
result, taxpayers affected by COVID-19 automatically received an extension of the April 15 deadline until July 15. Taxpayers could seek an
additional filing extension until October 15 by completing a form
online—though no extension was available for the tax itself, meaning
that any amount not paid by July 15 would be subject to relevant interest and penalties.14 The notices also gave taxpayers until July 15 to file
petitions with the Tax Court or seek review of a Tax Court decision, file
claims for credit or refund of tax, and bring suit upon such claims, so
long as the relevant time period had not expired before April 1.15
The choice to stretch the tax timeline out six months accorded with
early predictions of the pandemic’s likely duration.16 However, October
15, 2020, came and went with little light at the end of the tunnel for the
United States. While countries like China and New Zealand reached
low case levels,17 American infection rates experienced a second surge.18
Almost all government state of emergency declarations remained active
approaching the one-year mark.19 The modest three-month petition and
/news.release/archives/empsit_04032020.pdf [http://perma.cc/8FYC-KWJ2] (updated Sept. 2020);
The Employment Situation, April 2020, BUREAU OF LABOR STATS., http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_05082020.pdf [http://perma.cc/H629-RWQ9] (updated Sept. 2020).
13
See generally 2020-23 I.R.B., https://www.irs.gov/irb/2020-23_IRB [https://perma.cc/57EPB48Z]; 2020-18 I.R.B. 742, https://www.irs.gov/irb/2020-18_IRB [https://perma.cc/E78V-Q3QF].
14
I.R.S. News Release IR-2020-153 (July 14, 2020), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/irs-reminder-taxpayers-can-get-an-extension-to-oct-15-to-file-taxes [https://perma.cc/V4HC-T4W6].
15
See generally 2020-23 I.R.B., https://www.irs.gov/irb/2020-23_IRB [https://perma.cc/57EPB48Z]; 2020-18 I.R.B. 742, https://www.irs.gov/irb/2020-23_IRB [https://perma.cc/57EP-B48Z].
16
COVID-19 Is Here. Now How Long Will It Last?, YALE SCH. OF PUB. HEALTH (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://medicine.yale.edu/news-article/23446 [http://perma.cc/4GDG-R8HP] (interviewing Professor Virginia Pitzer, who said that “with only modest control measures . . . models predict the peak
would occur around July and the outbreak would last until early fall”).
17
Megan Scudellari, How the Pandemic Might Play Out in 2021 and Beyond, NATURE (Aug.
5, 2020), http://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-02278-5 [http://perma.cc/7HUW-FCR7].
18
Grace Hauck & Jayme Fraser, COVID-19 Cases in U.S. Grow at a Speed Not Seen Since
July, the Summer Peak, USA TODAY (Oct. 17, 2020), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health
/2020/10/15/coronavirus-cases-us-growing-speed-not-seen-since-july/3662942001
[http://perma.cc/4GLU-72VG]; Manny Fernandez et. al, The Virus Is Devastating the U.S., and
Leaving an Uneven Toll, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/04/us/covidunited-states-surge.html [https://perma.cc/XC88-ZBZJ].
19
All fifty states and the federal government declared states of emergency in response to the
pandemic. See Status of State COVID-19 Emergency Orders, NAT’L GOVERNORS ASS’N (last updated
Dec. 17, 2020), http://www.nga.org/state-covid-19-emergency-orders/ [https://perma.cc/8MDE2X3U]; Proclamation No. 9994, 85 Fed. Reg. 15,337 (Mar. 18, 2020). Michigan’s order was voided
in October when the state’s Supreme Court held that the Governor did not have authority to extend
its duration; Alaska’s order expired on February 14th. Each State’s COVID-19 Reopening and Reclosing Plans and Mask Requirements, NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (Feb. 8, 2021),
https://www.nashp.org/governors-prioritize-health-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/E9U6-9W3P].
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claim filing extension, seemingly sufficient when it was granted in
March, did nothing to aid taxpayers who were prevented by pandemicrelated complications from meeting deadlines either before April 1 or
after July 15.
And taxpayers might miss such deadlines for a whole host of understandable reasons. For example, they may suffer from a more severe
form of COVID-19, possibly to the point of requiring hospitalization.
They may be responsible for caring for sick loved ones or young children
whose care options are unavailable due to the pandemic. Their employment obligations may be a barrier to timeliness, especially those who
have become underemployed as a result of the economic downturn or
who must compensate for another source of household income disappearing. The pandemic has also interfered with the accessibility of the
Tax Court, tax preparation services, and legal services. These are just
a few of the many compelling reasons that a petitioner may struggle to
satisfy the Tax Code’s rigid demands, which were crafted without contemplating their viability during a public health crisis.
Unfortunately, many tax filing deadlines are considered jurisdictional and are therefore unyielding to equitable exceptions. Regulators
and legislators have not yet adjusted the statutory landscape to accommodate individuals who fail to meet tax filing deadlines due to COVID19-related challenges.20 However, relief may lie in the courts for some
taxpayers. Recent scholarship has relied on modern Supreme Court
precedents in urging courts to reclassify several tax deadlines as nonjurisdictional,21 and some courts have begun to do so.22
Building from that analysis, this Comment argues that the Tax
Court should make equitable tolling available for tax plaintiffs whose
pandemic-related challenges have prevented them from meeting nonjurisdictional filing deadlines. Part II expands on the tax litigation environment, including court structures and the doctrines of jurisdictional
and non-jurisdictional filing deadlines and equitable tolling. Part III
discusses cases from other bodies of law in which courts granted equitable tolling and examines similarities to the tax context. Ultimately,
Part III argues that equitable tolling should be available in the tax context and articulates a nexus test as a limiting principle. Part IV follows
by analyzing arguments for and against making equitable tolling available, considering access to justice and economy of resources. Part V concludes that equitable tolling is an appropriate and necessary avenue of
20

The Biden administration’s Taxpayer Advocate Service has recommended characterizing
all periods within the IRS as flexible claims-processing rules. See infra note 82.
21
See generally Bryan T. Camp, New Thinking About Jurisdictional Time Periods in the Tax
Code, 73 TAX L. 1 (2019).
22
See, e.g., Walby v. United States, 957 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
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relief for pandemic-afflicted taxpayers, and that the Tax Court is
uniquely well-suited to provide that relief.
II. THE TAX LITIGATION ENVIRONMENT: COURT STRUCTURES AND
DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND
CLAIMS-PROCESSING RULES
A few key procedural peculiarities govern the progression of tax
cases. First, tax cases are distinct from many other federal matters in
that they do not always begin in United States district courts. Additionally, they arise under a complex landscape of various filing deadlines,
and depending on the jurisdictional character of the deadlines, different
consequences can arise when plaintiffs file late. This Part provides further detail on the mechanics of filing tax cases.
A. The Life Cycle of a Tax Case
When a taxpayer disputes an adverse action or decision by the IRS,
he or she can usually seek judicial review.23 United States district
courts hear tax cases, but so do the Tax Court, the Bankruptcy Courts,
and the Court of Federal Claims—all Article I courts.24 The type of adverse action and the relief sought to remedy it, corresponding with specific provisions of the Tax Code, dictate which forum or fora will be
available in a given case.25 Sometimes only one will have jurisdiction
over the claim,26 but often the petitioner will have a choice in where he
or she wants to litigate the case.27
The Tax Court is the most common forum for tax cases.28 One reason for this is that plaintiffs may petition the Tax Court before paying
the adverse determinations against them, whereas to file in district
court they must pay first and seek a refund.29 Additionally, Tax Court
decisions are made by judges rather than juries, and Tax Court judges
have a greater degree of expertise in tax law than do most district court
judges.30 Additionally, choice of law is not a great concern when deciding between the Tax Court and the district court. Though differing precedents and judicial preferences might be relevant for matters of first
23

See Thomas Greenaway, Choice of Forum in Federal Civil Tax Litigation, 62 TAX L. 311,
316 (2009) (noting some exceptions to the availability of judicial review).
24
Id. at 311.
25
See id. at 312.
26
See id. at 313–14.
27
Id. at 312.
28
Id. at 316.
29
Id. at 317.
30
Robert M. Howard, Comparing the Decision Making of Specialized Courts and General
Courts: An Exploration of Tax Decisions, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 135, 138 (2005).
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impression, the Tax Court applies the law of the appellate circuit to
which its decision would be appealed if that circuit has ruled on the
issue in question.31
B. Distinguishing Jurisdictional Requirements from Claims-Processing Rules
When a statute or procedural rule establishes a filing deadline and
a plaintiff has failed to meet it, courts must decide whether to treat the
deadline as a jurisdictional requirement or as a mere claims-processing
rule. If a deadline is jurisdictional, failure to meet it entirely deprives a
court of its ability to hear the case.32 Claims-processing rules, on the
other hand, are not intended to determine courts’ adjudicatory capacity;
instead, they “seek to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times.”33 They are not jurisdictional, and if one is not met, a court
may disregard the plaintiff’s tardiness in some circumstances.34
For many years, the courts approached the distinction between jurisdictional requirements and claims-processing rules “less than [meticulously],” often using terminology loosely in “drive-by jurisdictional
rulings.”35 This approach resulted in a strict filing deadline landscape
operating on a presumption that requirements were jurisdictional unless specified otherwise.36
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has endeavored to clarify
this body of law.37 In a line of cases beginning in the late 2000s, the
Court began elaborating on the distinction between requirements that
implicate jurisdiction and requirements that merely facilitate the administration of claims.38 As part of this effort, the Court announced a
“readily administrable bright line rule” which flipped the existing presumption and instead held that deadlines are non-jurisdictional in
character unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise.39 A finding that
a requirement is jurisdictional under the new rule requires evidence of

31

Golsen v. Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 756–57 (1970).
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 216–17 (2007) (Souter, J., dissenting).
33
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435 (2011).
34
Bowles, 551 U.S. at 216–17 (Souter, J., dissenting).
35
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 160–62 (2010) (citing Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp.,
546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006)).
36
Camp, supra note 21, at 4.
37
Id.
38
See Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516; Shinseki, 562 U.S. at 435–36.
39
Shinseki, 562 U.S. at 435–36 (citing Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 514–15, 515–16).
32
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clear congressional intent to tie the deadline to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction.40
Following these recent cases, when a statute establishes a deadline
for timely filing and a plaintiff has failed to meet it, courts assess the
statute’s unique context to determine congressional intent. Clear congressional intent that a requirement was intended to be jurisdictional
in nature can exist even without use of the “magic words” of jurisdiction.41 For example, in Bowles v. Russell,42 the Supreme Court ruled
that Congress demonstrated clear intent to make a statutory time limit
for taking an appeal jurisdictional by leaving undisturbed a long line of
cases treating it as such.43 However, the contrary can also be true; in
Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick,44 the Court held that the mere use of
the word “jurisdictional” within a statute was not by itself sufficient
evidence of clear congressional intent.45 Similarly, “[m]ere proximity to
a jurisdictional provision is insufficient.”46
But in instances where clear intent is demonstrated, a court treats
the plaintiff’s failure to timely file as a total prohibition against hearing
the case at all.47 The government may not willingly waive or unwittingly
forfeit its timeliness objection to the suit, and the plaintiff may not benefit from any equitable exceptions.48 Such an objection may be raised at
any point during the litigation, even after a determination has been
made on the merits, and if not raised by the defendant, then it must be
raised sua sponte.49
In the absence of clear congressional intent to make timely filing a
prerequisite for personal or subject matter jurisdiction, courts now presume that filing deadlines are non-jurisdictional claims-processing
rules.50 Timeliness objections based on claims-processing rules still may
defeat a plaintiff’s suit if appropriately raised, but defendants may voluntarily waive or unintentionally forfeit these objections, and the court
40

Shinseki, 562 U.S. at 435–36.
Id.
42
551 U.S. 205 (2007).
43
Id. at 210–11.
44
559 U.S. 154 (2010).
45
Id. at 163–65.
46
Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r, 967 F.3d 760, 764 (8th Cir. 2020).
47
Henderson ex rel. Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 433 (2011) (citing Bowles v. Russell,
551 U.S. 205, 213–14 (2007)).
48
Shinseki, 562 U.S. at 433 (citing Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213–14) (explaining that a jurisdictional statutory limitation “could not be excused based on equitable factors, or on the opposing
party’s forfeiture or waiver of any objection to the late filing”).
49
Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 153–54 (2013) (citing Arbaugh v. Y&H
Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)).
50
Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516 (“But when Congress does not rank a statutory limitation on coverage as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as non-jurisdictional in character.”).
41
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may not raise them sua sponte.51 Courts also may equitably toll deadlines set out in claims-processing rules,52 assuming certain conditions
are met, as discussed further infra Part II.C.
However, it is unclear whether equitable tolling may be applied to
all claims-processing rules. The Supreme Court has sometimes differentiated claims-processing rules that are mandatory from those that
are not, and under current jurisprudence, tolling is only clearly available for non-mandatory claims-processing rules.53 Like nonmandatory
claims-processing rules, mandatory rules are subject to waiver and forfeiture,54 but the Supreme Court has not clarified whether they may
ever be subject to equitable tolling, reserving the question as recently
as 2019.55
Like the distinction between jurisdictional requirements and
claims-processing rules, the distinction between mandatory and nonmandatory rules lies in congressional intent; courts analyze whether
the “pertinent rule or rules invoked show a clear intent to preclude tolling,”56 and they presume the availability of tolling57 unless there is clear
evidence to the contrary.58 However, the Court has not articulated a
functional reason for distinguishing between mandatory and non-mandatory claims-processing rules. Without one, the difference may be unnecessary and arbitrary. Further, the usage of “mandatory” traces its
origins to the drive-by jurisdictional ruling era, casting doubt on
whether there is real utility in the distinction.59 This is an area of doctrine that would benefit from further elaboration.
51

See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Serv. of Chi., 138 S. Ct. 13, 18 (2017) (citations omitted).
United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 407–410 (2015) (citing Irwin v. Dep’t of
Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89, 95–96 (1990)) (explaining that the Government may rebut the presumption of tolling, articulated in Irwin, by demonstrating that a deadline is jurisdictional, but
that, without more, mandatory language associated with claims-processing rules is not enough to
preclude tolling).
53
See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 139 S. Ct. 710, 714 (2019) (“[S]ome claim-processing
rules are ‘mandatory’ . . . . Rules in this [ ] camp are not susceptible of the equitable approach . . . .”).
54
Id. at 714.
55
See Hamer, 138 S. Ct. at 18 n.3; Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 n.5 (2019).
56
Nutraceutical Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 714.
57
Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95–96.
58
Nutraceutical Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 714.
59
Nutraceutical Corp., 139 S. Ct. at 714, cites Manrique v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1266,
1271–72 (2017), for the proposition that some claims-processing rules are mandatory, and therefore their prescribed time limits are unalterable despite the availability of waiver and forfeiture.
But Manrique was in turn relying on Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 15 (2005), a case
which endeavored to make sense of the “mandatory and jurisdictional” language found in United
States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960), in light of the Court’s decision in Kontrick v. Ryan,
540 U.S. 443, 456 (2004). Kontrick was part of the Court’s early efforts to begin using the term
“jurisdictional” more precisely. None of these cases demonstrate a clear, conscious decision to create a distinction between different claims-processing rules; they may be better understood as a
52
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C. Jurisdictional Requirements and Claims-Processing Rules in the
Tax Context
In a recent article, Professor Bryan T. Camp thoroughly analyzed
the Supreme Court’s shift in guidance on jurisdictional requirements
and claims-processing rules.60 He then applied that new thinking to
four provisions of the Tax Code that courts have historically considered
jurisdictional and concluded that three of those provisions should now
be considered non-jurisdictional.61
For example, Professor Camp addressed 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1),
which prescribes the time period by which taxpayers may petition the
Tax Court when the IRS intends to file a Notice of Federal Tax Lien or
undertake a levy action.62 In those situations, the IRS must notify the
taxpayer, and in response, the taxpayer can request a Collection Due
Process (CDP) administrative hearing.63 Following that hearing, the
IRS will issue a Notice of Determination.64 If the determination is unfavorable, § 6330(d)(1) prescribes that “[t]he person may, within thirty
days of a determination under this section, petition the Tax Court for
review of such determination (and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction
with respect to such matter).”65 Evaluating the text as well as its statutory, judicial, and legislative contexts holistically, Professor Camp argued that the time period is actually a mere claims-processing rule, as
the jurisdiction clause is grammatically independent from the time period, and the jurisdiction refers to the content of the matter rather than
the petition itself.66 Further, he asserted that the legislative history
demonstrates that the purpose of the CDP scheme was an equitable
one, effected to prevent the IRS from taking advantage of taxpayers.67
Unfortunately, the perception of tax as a “self-contained body of
law” has historically prevented it from benefiting from developments in
other areas.68 Despite growing academic support for modernizing tax

vestige of attempting to extricate “mandatory” from “jurisdictional.”
60
See generally Camp, supra note 21.
61
Camp, supra note 21, at 3–4.
62
Most Litigated Issues — Appeals From CDP Hearings Under IRC §§ 6320 and 6330,
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE SERVICE, 1 ANN. REP. TO CONGRESS 488, 488 (2018), https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/ARC18_Volume1_MLI_05_AppealsCDP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DVW5-RWPQ].
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) (2018).
66
Camp, supra note 21, at 36–40.
67
Id.
68
Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Tax Lawyers,
13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518 (1994).

388

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2021

law with existing administrative law principles,69 its traditional isolationism has continued to manifest in some recent lower court rulings
which have failed to incorporate the new guidance on jurisdictional requirements. In July 2020, the Eighth Circuit joined the Ninth Circuit
and the Tax Court in holding that the filing deadline prescribed by
§ 6330(d)(1) remains jurisdictional.70 But the District of Columbia Circuit’s precedent diverges from the majority approach; in Myers v. Commissioner,71 the court held that § 7623(b)(4)—which contains a parenthetical jurisdiction clause identical to the one in § 6330(d)(1)—is nonjurisdictional.72 The Myers court relied on analysis similar to Professor
Camp’s in its rulings,73 indicating that litigants may slowly but surely
begin to see some success when challenging jurisdictional requirements
using the Supreme Court’s more recent guidance. Such is the first step
toward securing relief for COVID-19-affected taxpayers in the form of
waiver, forfeiture, or equitable tolling.
However, there are several time periods that litigants will likely
not be able to persuade a court to consider non-jurisdictional. For example, two courts have recently rejected Professor Camp’s conclusion
that the context of 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) points toward the time limit for
petitioning the Tax Court to contest a Notice of Deficiency being a nonjurisdictional requirement.74 Similarly, Professor Camp suggests that
26 U.S.C. § 6015(e), which allows for petition of innocent spouse relief,
should remain jurisdictional under the new Supreme Court guidance,75
and no court has recently deviated from that position.76
69

See, e.g., Amandeep S. Grewal, Taking Administrative Law to Tax, 63 DUKE L.J. 1625
(2014).
70
See Boechler, P.C. v. Comm’r, 967 F.3d 760, 765 (8th Cir. 2020); Duggan v. Comm’r, 879
F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018); Guralnik v. Comm’r, 146 T.C. 230, 235–36 (2016).
71
928 F.3d 1025 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
72
Id. at 1036.
73
The court favorably cited arguments raised by amicus curiae Federal Tax Clinic of the Legal
Services Center of Harvard Law School, which has noted on its blog “Procedurally Taxing” that it
is aware of and agrees with Professor Camp’s analysis of jurisdictional requirements. Thus, despite
the lack of a direct citation, the Myers court is likely, in essence, implementing Professor Camp’s
suggestions. See D.C. Circuit Holds Tax Court Whistleblower Award Filing Deadline Not Jurisdictional and Subject to Equitable Tolling, PROCEDURALLY TAXING (July 3, 2019), http://procedurallytaxing.com/d-c-circuit-holds-tax-court-whistleblower-award-filing-deadline-not-jurisdictionaland-subject-to-equitable-tolling [http://perma.cc/R3M8-WT3K].
74
Compare Camp, supra note 21, at 23–36, with Rivas v. Comm’r, 2020 WL 5025892, at *3–5
(T.C. Aug. 25, 2020) (declining to deviate from precedent that held the time limit in 26 U.S.C.
§ 6213(a) to be jurisdictional), and Fujita v. Comm’r, 816 F. App’x 209, 209–10 (9th Cir. 2020)
(unpublished) (treating 28 U.S.C. § 6213(a) as a jurisdictional requirement).
75
Camp, supra note 21, at 40–48 (treating § 6015 differently than §§ 6213 and 6330 based on
clear textual links between the deadline and jurisdiction, its statutory context being that it was
enacted simultaneously with another jurisdictional provision, well-reasoned judicial decisions of
well-litigated cases treating it as jurisdictional, and weak legislative evidence of an intent to make
the provision non-jurisdictional).
76
Id. at 42–44.
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Arguing for reclassification of filing deadlines currently characterized as jurisdictional is beyond the scope of this Comment; instead, this
Comment argues for the use of equitable tolling in the narrow class of
cases where it is already available, including but not limited to:
§ 6330(d)(1) (in the D.C. Circuit);77 § 6532(c) (in the Ninth Circuit);78
and § 6532(a) (in the Ninth Circuit).79 Equitable tolling could also become more widely available if and when courts later reevaluate their
precedents or Congress passes new legislation. Though the Supreme
Court recently declined to revisit its treatment of jurisdictional requirements in the tax context,80 such reevaluation could still occur sooner
rather than later at the encouragement of the Taxpayer Advocate Service.81 Under the Biden administration, the Service has published a legislative recommendation that Congress should characterize all periods
within the Internal Revenue Code as not jurisdictional and therefore
subject to forfeiture, waiver, estoppel, and tolling.82 Equitable tolling
analysis will be relevant in addressing pandemic-related tax litigation
as it slowly works its way through the courts, and it would become especially significant in the event that additional filing deadlines are
characterized as claims-processing rules in the meantime.
D. The Doctrine of Equitable Tolling and Applications in the Tax
Context
Equitable tolling gives courts discretion to forgive plaintiffs’ failure
to file their petition within the time period prescribed by statute or procedural rule.83 The doctrine of equitable tolling is a “long-established

77

Myers v. Comm’r, 928 F.3d 1025, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
Volpicelli v. United States, 777 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 2015).
79
Rubin v. United States, 2019 WL 7205995, at *1, *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2019) (allowing
equitable tolling when Plaintiff technically filed outside the statutory period but had complied
with written instructions from the IRS because “[t]he public has a right to rely on the written
instructions of its administrative agencies”).
80
Organic Cannabis Found., LLC v. Comm’r, 962 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 2021
WL 1725185 (U.S. May 3, 2021).
81
The Taxpayer Advocate Service is an independent organization within the IRS that helps
taxpayers navigate the system and understand their rights. It offers help to taxpayers on an individual basis, and it also screens for systemic issues which it then presents to Congress via annual
reports. See Who We Are, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV. (last visited June 26, 2021), https://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/RTJ8-RVDK]. One of its key successes was convincing Congress to enact the Taxpayer Bill of Rights. See Andrew R. Roberson, The Taxpayer Bill
of Rights: A Primer and Thoughts on Things to Come, AM. BAR ASS’N (May 25, 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/taxation/publications/abataxtimes_home/18may/18maypbm-roberson-the-taxpayer-bill-of-rights/ [https://perma.cc/ND8S-KH3V].
82
Legislative Recommendation #47: Provide That Time Limits for Bringing Tax Litigation Are
Subject to the Judicial Doctrines of Forfeiture, Waiver, Estoppel, and Equitable Tolling (“Rec. 47”),
TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV., 2021 PURPLE BOOK 100, 102 (2021).
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Lozano v. Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 10 (2014).
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feature of American jurisprudence,” and “Congress ‘legislates against a
background of common-law adjudicatory principles.’”84 Accordingly,
courts presume equitable tolling applies unless there is “good reason to
believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply.”85
To qualify for relief, plaintiffs must prove that they diligently pursued their rights, but “some extraordinary circumstance” prevented
timely filing.86 Equitable tolling is distinct from equitable estoppel in
that the extraordinary circumstances triggering its application must
have been beyond the control of both parties.87 Extraordinary circumstances are those that severely interfere with the plaintiff’s ability to
bring suit, such as serious attorney misconduct or error88 or plaintiff’s
mental incompetence.89
The tax context is no exception to the availability of equitable tolling. For example, in Johnsen v. United States,90 a district court granted
equitable tolling when the petitioners were adjudicated to be incompetent and their legal representative filed an administrative claim immediately after being appointed.91 Another district court also tolled the
limitations period in Rubin v. United States,92 in which the IRS had
mailed a notice of disallowance to the petitioner but also sent a separate
notice to his tax attorney two weeks later, which instructed that the
Plaintiff had two years from the date of the letter to file suit.93 The
Plaintiff filed suit on the day before the expiration of the two-year period that followed the date of the letter mailed to his attorney.94 Because
the period actually began running when the initial notice was mailed,
his filing was late.95 However, the court allowed for tolling based on the
right of the public “to rely on the written instructions of its administrative agencies,” reflecting a concern that time-barring the claim might
encourage the IRS to engage in “deliberate trickery” going forward.96
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Id. at 10–11 (citations and alterations omitted).
Myers v. Comm’r, 928 F.3d 1025, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Brockamp,
519 U.S. 347, 350 (1997)).
86
Lozano, 572 U.S. at 10–11.
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Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 568 U.S. 145, 164 (2013).
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Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010).
89
Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court, 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998), abrogated on other grounds by
Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202 (2003).
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758 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
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Id. at 836.
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2019 WL 7205995 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2019).
93
Id. at *6.
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Id.
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Id.
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However, courts often do not reach the issue of whether equitable
tolling applies in a tax case, given that many filing deadlines are still
characterized as jurisdictional and thus are not subject to exceptions.97
And even when equitable tolling is available, if a plaintiff has a compelling case, the IRS often settles pre-trial, limiting the availability of case
law on facts that merit the application of tolling.98
Further, when courts do reach the issue of equitable tolling, they
tend to be stricter about its applicability in the tax context than in other
areas of law.99 For example, in Thompson v. Commissioner,100 the plaintiff claimed that she had been incorrectly advised by the IRS, somewhat
like the plaintiff in Rubin. However, unlike in Rubin, this plaintiff did
not have unbiased, written documentation of the IRS’s instructions to
her.101 The Tax Court was incredibly skeptical of the plaintiff’s claims,
describing her narrative as “unsupported, self-serving testimony that
the Court is reluctant to rely on.”102 The Thompson decision not to grant
tolling seemed motivated by a concern about rewarding inexcusable neglect,103 a well-established societal concern.104
But the Thompson court relied on somewhat outdated case law to
reach its conclusions, echoing language from United States v.
Brockamp.105 In that 1997 case, the Court described tax law as “not normally characterized by case-specific exceptions reflecting individualized
equities,”106 therefore requiring an especially compelling case for tolling
to be warranted. Brockamp, however, was applying another case about
tolling,107 Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs,108 and the Irwin presumption in favor of equitable tolling is treated as stronger today than
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See, e.g., Guralnik v. Comm’r, 146 T.C. 230, 235–36 (2016).
See, e.g., Volpicelli v. United States, No. 3:10-CV-00548 (D. Nev. Mar. 4, 2016) (order on
stipulation for dismissal with prejudice terminating the case) (Plaintiff was a minor when the IRS
wrongfully levied his college savings in response to his father’s tax debts; the Ninth Circuit held
that § 6532(c) is non-jurisdictional and subject to equitable tolling and remanded to the District
Court for consideration of whether tolling should apply).
99
United States v. Brockamp, 519 U.S. 347, 352 (1997) (“Tax law, after all, is not normally
characterized by case-specific exceptions reflecting individualized equities.”).
100
2008 WL 1744267 (T.C. Apr. 16, 2008).
101
Id. at *4–5.
102
Id. at *7.
103
Id.
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See NOAH J. GORDON & GLENDA K. HARNAD, 27A AM. JUR. 2D EQUITY § 108 (“Laches is
founded on the notion that equity aids the vigilant, and not those who sleep on their rights to the
detriment of the opposing party . . . .”); JAMES BUCHWALTER & JOHN KIMPFLEN, 30A C.J.S. EQUITY
§ 140 (“The doctrine of laches has existed since the beginning of equity jurisdiction . . . .”).
105
519 U.S. 347 (1997).
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Id. at 352.
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Id. at 349–50.
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498 U.S. 89 (1990).
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it was when Brockamp was decided.109 Thompson reflects the reality
that, despite academic momentum in favor of modernizing tax along
with developments in other bodies of law,110 the Tax Court is hesitant
to change. Thus, for courts—particularly the Tax Court—to allow equitable tolling in response to the pandemic, taxpayer-petitioners will
likely need to demonstrate strong, well-documented facts about how
COVID-19 directly interfered with their ability to file.
III. OTHER APPLICATIONS OF EQUITABLE TOLLING SUPPORT
APPLICATION IN THE TAX CONTEXT BASED ON COVID-19
CIRCUMSTANCES
Despite courts’ hesitation to apply equitable tolling in the context
of tax disputes, case law on tolling from both before and during the
COVID-19 pandemic may have sufficiently similar facts to be persuasive.111 First, this Part examines district courts’ treatment of equitable
tolling in response to prior states of emergency, which create comparable barriers to the courts as the recent pandemic. Next, this Part discusses cases from other subject areas in which courts granted tolling in
direct response to COVID-19. It then analyzes the cases’ similarities to
the tax context and argues that it is both necessary and appropriate for
courts adjudicating tax disputes to follow suit, concluding with a proposed test to make the application of tolling workable.
A.

Equitable Tolling During States of Emergency

Courts have recognized equitable tolling in situations where plaintiffs were unable to timely file due to circumstances which also gave rise
to a declared state of emergency. For example, in McKibben v. Eastern
Hospitality Management, Inc.,112 a district court ruled in favor of plaintiffs when inclement weather prevented them from filing a personal injury claim within the bounds of the statute of limitations.113 The weekend before the deadline for the McKibbens to file their claim, a severe
snowstorm hit their county. The governor declared a state of emergency, instructed citizens to only travel on state roads for emergencies,

109

See United States v. Kwai Fun Wong, 575 U.S. 402, 407–410 (2015) (citing Irwin, 498 U.S.
at 95–96).
110
See Grewal, supra note 69.
111
It is important to note that litigation takes time to develop, especially during a pandemic
where legal and financial resources are limited; the cases that have emerged first are the most
urgent ones, such as habeas and compassionate release cases brought by prisoner plaintiffs. Over
time, more general civil litigation will emerge, and along with it a better understanding of how
courts might respond to equitable tolling arguments in less urgent matters.
112
288 F. Supp. 2d 723 (N.D. W. Va. 2003).
113
Id. at 724.
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and required the courthouse to close.114 Several people died, and tens of
thousands of power outages occurred as a result of the storm.115
State law would permit the extension of the filing period to the next
day the courthouse was open following the emergency, but because the
courthouse was not properly closed by court personnel, the extension
was not available. The McKibbens were technically deprived of their
claim despite their inability, through no fault of their own, to bring a
timely action.116 However, the court held that it would be “manifestly
unjust to deny the plaintiffs the opportunity to bring an otherwise
timely claim because the county commission wisely closed the courthouse during extreme weather conditions” which “required the plaintiffs to do the impossible: file a complaint on a day that the courthouse
was ‘improperly,’ yet appropriately, closed.”117 At least one other district
court has followed the McKibben decision.118
Courts have also repeatedly allowed equitable tolling in habeas
cases when flooding that prompted declaration of states of emergency
and caused disruption of prison routines and evacuations prevented
prisoners from timely filing their petitions.119
B. Equitable Tolling Due to COVID-19’s Impact on Access to Counsel
and the Courts
Lower courts have already started to endorse the idea that the challenges posed by COVID-19, and long-lasting pandemics more generally,
qualify as the type of extraordinary circumstances which should warrant application of equitable tolling. These decisions have primarily
been made in the context of habeas petitions. Though at first blush, a
prisoner’s interest in liberty seems much more dire than a taxpayerpetitioner’s interest in property, both liberty and property have, since
the nation’s founding, been two of its most jealously guarded rights.120
Liberty cases may properly inform property rights cases on this ground,
even if disparate gravity of the rights warrants allowing greater leniency when evaluating tolling in liberty cases.
On March 30, 2020, the Eastern District of California granted prisoner Robert Wesley Cowan’s motion to prospectively equitably toll the
114

Id.
Id.
116
Id. at 724–25.
117
Id. at 725 (emphasis omitted).
118
See Allie v. Whole Foods Mkt. Grp., Inc., 746 F. Supp. 2d 773 (E.D. Va. 2010).
119
See, e.g., Jackson v. Cain, 2014 WL 4678808 (M.D. La. Sept. 19, 2014); Murray v. Cain, 2019
WL 1417442 (M.D. La. Mar. 5, 2019).
120
THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that a key reason to adopt the Constitution is that it will afford additional security “to liberty, and to property”).
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limitations period prescribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244, the federal habeas
statute, from May 15 to August 13.121 The court allowed tolling on the
basis that “emergency conditions brought about by [the] pandemic had
and would prevent petitioner’s timely completion of the petition to be
filed . . . notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence.”122
In August, the court granted him another extension until November 11 based on the pandemic’s interference with his access to counsel
and the closure and impairment of function of the courts.123 It found
that, “notwithstanding the continuing exercise of clearly reasonable diligence, the COVID-19 pandemic makes it unlikely and very well impossible that a complete federal habeas petition . . . can be completed and
filed prior to the requested, as tolled deadline of November 11, 2020.”124
The court granted equitable tolling yet again in November, extending his filing deadline until May 11, 2021, based on “governmental and
judicial emergencies; various stay-at-home directives; cancellation of
prison visits;” and “impediments to accessing office resources . . . and
related claim development” “continuing without a clear end in sight.”125
Similarly, in Pickens v. Shoop,126 the district court emphasized its
agreement that pandemic-related challenges should warrant the application of equitable tolling. Though it declined to grant the extraordinary
remedy of prospective tolling, the court was clear that it would be receptive to tolling arguments in response to hardships that had actually
materialized.127 The court acknowledged the impact of the declared
state of emergency on the function of government operations, noting
that it seemed “obvious that ‘extraordinary circumstances’ likely stand
in the way of Pickens timely filing a complete petition.”128 Though
stressing its preference for cautious approaches, the court signaled its
openness to tolling to future litigants by stressing that “this Court is
inclined to find equitable tolling as to any amended claim whose factual
predicate even facially appears to have required the type of in-person
contact, or any other activities such as travel, that the current state of
emergency impedes.”129
There is also indication that courts may respond to the severity of
COVID-19 by relaxing the standard for circumstances that rise to the
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123
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Cowan v. Davis, 2020 WL 4698968, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2020).
Id.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Cowan v. Davis, 2020 WL 6544251, at *1, *2–3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2020).
2020 WL 3128536 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2020).
Id. at *2–3.
Id. at *3.
Id. (emphasis added).
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level of extraordinary. In Brown v. Davis,130 the court found good cause
to allow the late filing of a reply brief when counsel erroneously calendared the due date for the petitioner’s reply brief and did not realize the
mistake due to COVID-19-related childcare responsibilities.131 Admittedly, the standard for allowing that type of late filing is much lower
than that for allowing equitable tolling.132 However, perhaps the decision still indicates an increasingly sympathetic view towards petitioners who request equitable tolling based on pandemic-related challenges,
much like Mr. Brown’s counsel’s new caretaking obligations. Further,
like the court in Cowan, the Brown court went on to prospectively equitably toll Brown’s deadline to file his habeas petition until June 1, 2021,
similarly based on the pandemic’s interference with court function and
access to counsel.133
Plaintiff Lemarkcus Kelly had similar success with an equitable
tolling argument in his Prison Litigation Reform Act compassionate release case.134 In United States v. Kelly,135 the court decided that the Act’s
exhaustion requirements were not jurisdictional and thus could be equitably tolled.136 It then found that the high number of COVID-19 cases
and deaths were extraordinary circumstances that prevented Kelly
from waiting out the exhaustion requirement.137 The statistics were
“not mere abstractions for Kelly,” as the first Bureau of Prisons inmate
COVID-19 death occurred at his facility138 and social distancing in
prison was difficult.
Lower courts are also extending the equitable tolling arguments
advanced by prisoner plaintiffs to administrative disputes, much like
the tax context. In Joseph v. United States,139 a California district court
considered an appeal from a United States Department of Agriculture
(USDA) decision to disqualify Save More Food Market, owned by the
plaintiffs, from participation in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
Program (SNAP).140 Based on analysis of the store’s SNAP transactions,
the agency concluded that the plaintiffs were engaging in “trafficking”
of SNAP benefits. 7 U.S.C. § 2023(a)(13) provides that plaintiffs have
130

482 F. Supp. 1049 (E.D. Cal. 2020).
Id. at 1052.
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See Purjes v. Plausteiner, 2017 WL 6055047, at *1, *3 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2017) (accepting the late filing of a reply brief in a footnote without discussion).
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Id. at *8.
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United States v. Kelly, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77080, at *1 (S.D. Miss. May 1, 2020).
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2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77080 (S.D. Miss. May 1, 2020).
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thirty days to file a complaint to obtain judicial review of the USDA’s
determination.141 The plaintiffs filed their complaint thirty-six days
late, but they argued that they should be eligible for equitable tolling
because their tardiness was attributable to the stay-at-home orders
which “impeded their ability to find and retain an attorney to prepare
the lawsuit.”142 The court agreed with the plaintiffs, describing the
“public health crisis and resulting restrictions on civil and personal life”
as “extraordinary circumstances by any measure.”143 The court suggested that the consequences of the pandemic were most keenly felt in
the early part of 2020 and noted that the plaintiffs’ time limit was running during that time.144
C. Similarities to the Tax Context
Pandemic-affected taxpayers make interesting cases for equitable
tolling. In some ways, they are like the plaintiff in Rubin v. United
States145 who was misled by a letter from the IRS, as the circumstances
giving rise to tolling are incredibly individualized. Yet they are also like
the plaintiffs in McKibben, who needed tolling in response to a natural
disaster that affected whole swaths of society in identical ways.146 A
blend of both personalized and communal implications is seen in Joseph
and the prisoner-plaintiff cases.147 Though COVID-19 is a shared setback which has generated challenges which are faced by many, it is the
unique experience of those challenges by a plaintiff which warrants the
application of equitable tolling.
Thus, despite the difference between the ongoing pandemic and the
short-term nature of a snowstorm, pandemic-affected taxpayers may
suffer from similar challenges to those which gave rise to the decision
in McKibben. Just like the snowstorms and floods in those cases,
COVID-19 has triggered states of emergency, and on a much greater
scale—active states of emergency in response to the pandemic endured
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Id. at *3.
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2019 WL 7205995, at *1, *6 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2019).
288 F. Supp. 2d 723 (N.D. W. Va. 2003).
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for several months in every state and nationally.148 In response, courthouses closed or reduced certain operations.149 The Tax Court specifically closed in March 2020,150 did not begin accepting mail again until
July 10,151 and as of one year later, still was not fully open to the public.152 Many of the IRS’s taxpayer and practitioner assistance services
were not staffed for a period of time153 and still were described in midDecember as having “service delays.”154 Further, lockdown and stay-athome orders have been issued, which may interfere with a plaintiff’s
ability to seek counsel.155 These are meaningful barriers for ordinary
taxpayers—much like those that existed for the plaintiffs in the state of
emergency cases.
One crucial difference between a COVID-19 case and the prior
cases, though, is that the pandemic has lasted over a year, while the
emergencies giving rise to McKibben and the other cases lasted only
days. Perhaps the duration matters. For example, as of 2017, the time
limit for filing a § 6532(c) wrongful levy suit is two years. Imagine a
taxpayer, Jane, whose period began running in September 2018. If Jane
did not begin seeking legal or tax assistance until March 2020, it may
be hard for her to claim equitable tolling, as eighteen months went by
as she failed to diligently pursue her rights. However, what if Jane’s
period began running in September 2019? By March 2020, only six
months would have passed; perhaps then she could argue that she was
not failing to be diligent, as she still had eighteen months left to file
when the barrier arose.
148

Status of State COVID-19 Emergency Orders, supra note 19.
Courts Suspending Jury Trials as COVID-19 Cases Surge, U.S. CTS. (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/11/20/courts-suspending-jury-trials-covid-19-cases-surge
[https://perma.cc/99H7-W3GL] (announcing that two dozen U.S. district courts were suspending
jury trials or grand jury proceedings and scaling back other courthouse activities).
150
Press Release, U.S. Tax Ct. (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press/03112020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q946-CDM4].
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Press Release, U.S. Tax Ct. (June 11, 2020), https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press
/06192020.pdf [https://perma.cc/95NV-8HJD].
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https://www.ustaxcourt.gov/press_releases.html [https://perma.cc/HNW4-FMRA].
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[https://perma.cc/ANQ5-76VN] (last updated July 16, 2021) (“Our service delays include: [l]ive
phone support, [p]rocessing tax returns filed on paper, [a]nswering mail from taxpayers, [r]eviewing tax returns, even for returns filed electronically.”).
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See Coronavirus Restrictions and Mask Mandates for All 50 States, N.Y. TIMES,
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Surely by the expiration of her filing deadline in September 2021,
Jane could find tax assistance or legal counsel. But now imagine that
Jane was one of the millions of Americans who lost her job because of
the COVID-19 pandemic.156 She likely only received $3,200 in stimulus
payments to get her through the summer of 2021, and that is assuming
she was able to qualify based on her 2019 tax return.157 Her state unemployment assistance was difficult to navigate.158 She blew through
her savings trying to pay rent,159 and eviction moratoria were about to
expire.160 Even though Jane might have had the time to find legal counsel or tax assistance in theory, her time was better used trying to make
ends meet, and she certainly did not have the money for it. In such a
case, the pandemic is long-lasting, but so are its effects, and courts may
consider whether duration is a mitigating factor in the fact-specific inquiry that is required to determine whether tolling is warranted.
Further, just because the pandemic is long-lasting does not mean
that all of its impacts are foreseeable or avoidable. Imagine another taxpayer, John. In November 2020, he was issued an unfavorable Notice of
Determination regarding the IRS’s intent to file a Notice of Federal Tax
Lien, which entitles him to petition the Tax Court under § 6330(d)(1).
He had thirty days to do so, and because he lived in the District of Columbia, this requirement was non-jurisdictional.161
Assume John was fortunate to avoid the struggles faced by Jane;
he kept his job, so he was able to begin seeking a lawyer by the end of
the first week, and by the end of the second week he had hired one and
began planning to file his suit. However, before finalizing plans with
the lawyer, John contracted COVID-19. He developed a severe case and
had to be hospitalized for two weeks, like approximately 15 percent of
hospitalized COVID-19 patients.162 When the lawyer did not hear from
156

The Employment Situation, supra note 12.
See What to Know About All Three Rounds of Coronavirus Stimulus Checks, PETER G.
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John, he did not file the suit, and John’s time limit expired. John was
diligently pursuing his rights, and extraordinary circumstances prevented him from meeting the deadline through no fault of his own. In
such a case, the long-lasting nature of the pandemic still does not provide an opportunity to mitigate barriers to timely filing.
Some of the burdens faced by our hypothetical tax plaintiffs are
identical to those that district courts have recognized when granting
equitable tolling for prisoner plaintiffs. Cowan, Pickens, and Brown asserted that COVID-19 had interfered with their ability to access the
materials necessary develop their cases, and the same is true for tax
plaintiffs; the pandemic also “wreaks havoc with taxpayers’ ability to
gather documents, find paid help, or even find free help.”163 The habeas
cases cited court closures as a reason for tolling, and those closures similarly affect tax plaintiffs.164 The Tax Court specifically was not fully
accessible beginning in March 2020, and still was not as of July 2021.165
The courts also noted the habeas plaintiffs’ difficulty when trying to
meet with their lawyers. In some ways that challenge is similar to the
unavailability and delay of IRS taxpayer and practitioner assistance
services that has occurred in the tax context;166 both struggles prevent
plaintiffs from getting the help they need to timely file.
Tax plaintiffs likely would have less in common with prisoners
seeking compassionate release, as the purpose of their tax litigation
would not be to seek relief from the exponential risk of contracting a
potentially deadly disease while incarcerated.167 To rely on such cases,
taxpayer-petitioners would need to establish that, due to preexisting
conditions, they would have been particularly at risk should they have
contracted COVID-19. Further, they would need to show that the activities necessary to meet their filing deadlines would have created greater
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risk of exposure to COVID-19. Considering that many taxpayer assistance resources are available online and the courts have adapted to the
virtual environment, taxpayer-petitioners seem unlikely to succeed on
this type of theory.168
Reliance on Joseph would likely be most persuasive for tax litigants. Taxpayers contesting a decision by the IRS are similarly situated
to participants in a government assistance program contesting a decision to disqualify them. Both are challenging administrative determinations in the courts, and they are likely litigating under statutes with
similar constructions. Further, the stakes of the decision are alike. Both
allege a monetary injury; there are no direct life or personal liberty interests at stake as in the prison plaintiff cases. Using a theory like the
one that succeeded in Joseph, tax plaintiffs who lived in areas with stayat-home orders during their periods of limitation may be able to persuade courts to grant equitable tolling based on impediment to their
ability to secure legal services.
In addition to the challenges giving rise to the state of emergency
and habeas cases, an estimated 51 percent of United States COVID-19
hospitalizations lasted longer than eight days.169 Many Americans
chose to quarantine away from their traditional primary residences
where they receive mail.170 And there were a myriad of service issues
with the United States Postal Service during 2020.171 It seems entirely
plausible that taxpayers could be prevented by any combination of these
extraordinary COVID-19 circumstances from satisfying filing deadlines. The extended duration of the federal and state declarations of
emergency lends support to the idea that the ongoing nature of the pandemic did not reduce the severity of its barriers to timely filing, and
courts should not lessen their sympathy for affected taxpayers just because they suffered COVID-19-related impacts later on in the pandemic.172
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D. Distinguishing COVID-19 from Other Routine Medical Care
The above discussion of the pandemic-related obstacles to bringing
suit illustrates why COVID-19 should be treated with more flexibility
than more common medical problems. First, many challenges created
by the pandemic are not present with other illnesses. Widespread lockdowns and court closures are unique responses to COVID-19’s high virulence and potential lethality, so petitioners experiencing other healthrelated difficulties would not have the same substantial barrier to accessing the courts and legal assistance.
Further, one would expect petitioners facing more routine medical
hardships to rely on their support networks of friends and family to
navigate any legal obligations that arose. The necessary public health
response to COVID-19 counsels the exact opposite—to fight the pandemic, government officials implored people to stay home and distance
from others to the greatest extent possible. Friends and family likely
would not shoulder the legal obligations themselves and would instead
assist with time management tasks such as meals, childcare, and other
household chores, in most cases requiring a substantial degree of inperson contact. Accordingly, reliance on support networks to meet filing
deadlines in a way that would traditionally be reasonable would, in this
case, run directly counter to more important public health policy.
And beyond the issue of contradicting public health policy, petitioners likely would also have practical problems turning to their support
networks during the pandemic. As discussed previously, COVID-19 has
drastically shifted caretaking and work obligations. During the pandemic, it seems probable that a struggling petitioner’s friends and family may themselves be struggling, and thus would be much less available to provide the assistance we would usually expect. Based on the
marked differences between the resources available to a typical taxpayer-petitioner experiencing routine medical hardship and those of
one impacted by COVID-19, it is reasonable to argue that the latter
should benefit from tolling even while the former, without more, would
not.
E. Possible Limiting Principles for Granting Tolling in Pandemic Tax
Cases
Because highly individualized analyses of COVID-19’s impact on
taxpayer-petitioners would likely prove unwieldy and inconsistent,
courts would benefit from reliance on limiting principles which promote
the orderly and fair application of equitable tolling. One example may
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be found in United States v. Henry,173 in which the Western District of
Pennsylvania held that a plaintiff did not qualify for pandemic-related
equitable tolling because there was “no apparent ‘nexus’ between
COVID-19 and [plaintiff’s] failure to timely file his motion.”174 Under
the nexus test, mere “conclusory assertions” that COVID-19 created extraordinary circumstances would be insufficient, and plaintiffs must actually show that the pandemic prevented timely filing by impeding
their ability to pursue their rights.175
To further develop the nexus test for use in determining the availability of tolling in tax cases, courts might borrow from 26 U.S.C.
§ 6511(h). Congress enacted § 6511(h) to partially overrule the Supreme
Court’s decision in United States v. Brockamp176 that the deadline for
filing tax refund claims was jurisdictional.177 Section 6511(h) creates an
exception that tolls the period of limitation in the event that a taxpayer
is financially disabled, defined as “unable to manage his financial affairs by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment” so long as it “can be expected to result in death or [ ] has lasted
or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12
months,” and the individual’s spouse or another person is not authorized to act on his or her behalf in financial matters.178
If § 6511(h)’s narrow definition of financial disability were the only
circumstance which created a nexus between COVID-19 and the failure
to file, only individuals who contracted COVID-19 and did not have
someone authorized to act on their behalf would qualify for tolling, and
it would only be warranted in refund or credit for overpayment cases.
Many petitioners validly affected by the pandemic and in need of procedural relief would be excluded. Thus, courts could employ a modified
definition of “disabled” which also includes petitioners who lost employment or income because of the pandemic’s economic impact, those who
struggled to obtain legal or tax assistance due to pandemic-related business closures, and those charged with new caregiving responsibilities
which interfered with their ability to build their cases.
Such an expansion of the definition of disability to determine a
nexus to COVID-19 would provide relief to deserving plaintiffs without
allowing frivolous claims. Section 6511(h)(2)(A) provides that individuals must furnish proof of their impairments, and courts could continue
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2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234135 (W.D. Penn. Dec. 14, 2020).
Id. at *8.
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to incorporate that requirement in order to weed out the aforementioned mere conclusory assertions. For example, a plaintiff who lost his
or her job for cause could not establish the necessary nexus, as the job
loss would not have resulted from COVID-19.
IV. GRANTING OF EQUITABLE TOLLING RELIEF IS NECESSARY AND
APPROPRIATE
Following from the conclusion that equitable tolling can be made
available to taxpayers who can establish a nexus between COVID-19
and their failure to meet tax deadlines, this Part argues that such relief
is both necessary and appropriate given economic circumstances. The
relief provided thus far did little to help taxpayers affected later in the
pandemic or by provisions beyond the return filing deadline, and there
is no clear evidence that Congress intended to make tolling relief unavailable. Further, the Tax Court and district courts are in a unique position to mitigate access to justice problems by providing tolling on first
instance, and such procedural relief would not be overly economically
burdensome.
A. Current Relief Is Inadequate
Though equitable tolling should be granted based on the circumstances of individual plaintiffs, COVID-19 has caused broad-based economic hardships affecting many across the country, underscoring the
urgency with which courts should act.179 Both federal and state governments have been conservative in their approach to relieving financial
burdens in response to the pandemic. The primary procedural tax relief
was the extension of filing deadlines through October 2020, and, as discussed in Part I, supra, that extension’s practical value was reduced by
the pandemic lasting much beyond its predicted six-month duration.180
When October came and went, taxes came due without struggling taxpayers having a real opportunity to get back on their feet. The deadline
extension also did not alter time limits beyond the one for filing tax
returns, which does little to help a person who was healthy up until
contracting the virus in November and was thus rendered unable to file
a timely response regarding a tax dispute. Such an outcome is not only
possible but likely given the high number of cases the United States has
experienced.181
179

See generally Brian Root & Lena Simet, United States: Pandemic Impact on People in Poverty, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Mar. 2, 2021), https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/03/02/united-states-pandemic-impact-people-poverty# [https://perma.cc/EUQ6-NQJY].
180
COVID-19 Is Here. Now How Long Will it Last?, supra note 16.
181
COVID in the U.S.: Latest Map and Case Count, supra note 8.

404

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM

[2021

Further, the stimulus payments likely did not constitute substantive tax burden relief for most. Through the Coronavirus Aid, Relief,
and Economic Security (CARES) Act,182 the federal government paid
out $1,200 in April 2020 to individuals who qualified based on their
2018 or 2019 tax returns, with an additional $600 available for each
dependent.183 The CARES Act also provided for unemployment benefits
of $600 per week for eleven weeks in addition to benefits provided by
state governments.184 The later stimulus packages in December 2020
and March 2021 provided for payment of $2,000 total in relief checks
for qualifying individuals.185 The enormous relief bills were without a
doubt legislative achievements, but individuals who qualified for the
April stimulus payment only received $1,809 on average186 to last them
the next nine months, all while the average United States rent cost as
of February 2020 was $1,468 per month.187
With United States vaccine distribution not nearing completion for
some time188 and the economy’s rebound following closely behind, taxpayers have continued to struggle with their tax liability without some
other kind of relief. The most compelling arguments against relief understandably would raise concerns about the balance against government interests in efficient administration and predictable tax revenue,
especially given the expenditure of trillions of dollars in aid.189 But utilizing equitable tolling would not implicate either of those interests.
Tolling is procedural relief and is therefore in fact the perfect balance
of interests—it allows taxpayers to manage their barriers to suit without reducing their substantive tax liability and thus interfering with
the government’s reliance interests in their tax revenue.
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B. Expanding Use of Equitable Tolling Does Not Present a Separation of Powers Problem
As the tests for jurisdictional requirements and the availability of
equitable tolling heavily focus on congressional intent, some may argue
that courts should leave expansions of equitable tolling to Congress.
But the CARES Act was signed into law back in March 2020.190 At that
time, Congress’s priorities were not all that long-term; the CARES Act’s
provisions addressing tax issues were focused on helping relieve immediate economic burdens for individuals and employers through rebate
and payroll tax adjustments.191 Alterations to procedural and jurisdictional considerations, in comparison, are longer-term solutions. The
CARES Act’s focus on immediate solutions reflects early predictions
that the pandemic would be over by fall,192 and its silence in March on
equitable tolling of tax filing deadlines should not be construed as an
explicit rejection of the idea.
Further, Congress’s failure to revisit the idea also should not be
considered a rejection. The legislature battled for months over a second
stimulus bill, so it is perhaps unsurprising that it did not get to the topic
of tax filing deadlines when it could hardly agree to approve $600 stimulus checks.193 Though the Democrats took control of the White House
and the Senate beginning in January 2021, Republicans quickly demonstrated that Democrats would need to make significant compromises in
order to accomplish their agenda,194 so it is uncertain how soon Congress would be able to enact the Taxpayer Advocate Service’s recommendation to make all IRC periods subject to equitable tolling.195
C. Access to Justice Concerns Exist Which the Tax Court and District Courts Are Uniquely Positioned to Resolve
Cases reconsidering old jurisdictional tax filing deadline precedents have most often come not from the Tax Court or district courts,
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but from the circuit courts of appeals.196 Civil appeals are famously expensive197 and take quite some time to resolve.198 Even before the
COVID-19 pandemic, scholars noted that “the costs of appeal, the demoralizing effect of a trial loss, the need for closure, and other factors”
might prevent filing of meritorious appeals.199 Aggrieved taxpayers are
already attempting to protect their financial assets from the government, and COVID-19 surely exacerbated the financial strain experienced by the petitioners who file suit.
The costs associated with appeals create an access to justice concern. If the lower courts issue “play-it-safe” jurisdictional decisions
which bar equitable tolling, an under-resourced plaintiff, whose claims
may ultimately be meritorious, might be forced to accept that unfavorable result. The lower courts are uniquely positioned to protect such
financially vulnerable petitioners from the costs of appeal by interpreting jurisdiction and equitable tolling more expansively in light of the
pandemic, as done in the decisions discussed in Part III, supra. While
the IRS could appeal when the lower courts rule for the petitioner, as
noted previously, it is plausible that the government will settle if the
petitioner has a compelling case.200
D. Allowing Tolling Would Not Be Resource-Prohibitive
As mentioned in Part IV.A, supra, the courts have particular reason, given 2020’s economic downturn and accompanying government
relief efforts, to be concerned about equitable tolling’s potential adverse
financial effects. One might worry that allowing equitable tolling for
taxpayers facing pandemic-related challenges could create an expensive
drain on government administrative resources and decrease the government’s reliance on those individuals’ tax revenue.
But the proportion of administrative proceedings against the IRS
relative to the total number of taxpayers is exceedingly small, and the
Tax Court only receives about 30,000 petitions per year.201 Even if all
196
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30,000 were appeals under non-jurisdictional time limits which were
not timely filed and warranted equitable tolling, the disruption to the
government’s predicted revenue stream would likely be fairly small.
And there’s no way that such a great proportion of those petitions would
fall into such a narrow category, considering the Tax Court’s jurisdiction to hear all sorts of tax-related disputes. Coupled with the bipartisan support of increasing funding for the IRS, which seems plausible
under the Biden administration,202 it also seems unlikely that a
changed approach to that narrow class of cases would significantly
strain IRS administrative resources.
V.

CONCLUSION

The COVID-19 pandemic and its accompanying economic consequences have left many Americans financially vulnerable with little to
no relief from their tax burdens. But one form of reprieve may be found
in the courts in the form of equitable tolling. If a taxpayer fails to satisfy
a filing deadline when they believe they have been wronged by the IRS,
but that deadline is a non-mandatory claims-processing rule rather
than a jurisdictional one, the courts have the power to make an equitable exception. To qualify, the plaintiff must have diligently pursued
their rights and only been prevented from timely filing by extraordinary
circumstances beyond their control.
Other applications of tolling—both before and during the pandemic—to states of emergency, prison litigation, and administrative appeals support the idea that the Tax Court and district courts adjudicating tax disputes should implement this equitable relief. Doing so will
provide procedural aid to taxpayers facing COVID-19-related barriers
to suit without materially altering their substantive tax liability in a
way that would be adverse to governmental interests. Courts can utilize
a nexus test expanding on prior statutory definitions of financial disability to ensure that equitable tolling is granted fairly and consistently
for plaintiffs whose failures to file have a documented connection to
COVID-19.
Providing such relief is both appropriate and necessary, and the
lower courts are uniquely positioned to help tax litigants. Doing so
would not be overly burdensome to the government and would immensely help burdened plaintiffs navigate the inequities of COVID-19.
Therefore, to promote justice and financial recovery, lower courts
law/?sh=499e500c2ba9 [https://perma.cc/5E7H-ERMA] (“The Tax Court dockets about 30,000
cases a year.”).
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should utilize equitable tolling in the narrow class of cases where it is
available.

